Abstract
Texas Gulf Coast for 10 years under the 1980, suy (e.g., Prentice-Hall; Richard-1981, and 1982 income tax provisions. Results son; Harl) . The rapidity with which tax law for this analysis indicate that the 1981 tax prorevisions have occurred in recent years has crevisions clearly were more beneficial to farm ated a hig degree of uncertainty as to the operators than the 1980 or 1982 income tax continuing direction of tax policy. Nevertheprovisions. While the 1981 and 1982 tax law less, it is important for policy decisionmakers changes clearly improved the cash flow of farm to have insight into the impact of these changing operators, they did not greatly improve the tax policies on individual farm operators. wealth positions of farm operators in the Texas Distinctions between the three tax laws which Gulf Coast.
have the greatest impact on farm operators are Key words: income tax; farm policy; simulation summarized in Table 1 . These changes affect a broad cross-section of farm operators who are sole proprietors. Other farming entities will be During the past 3 years there have been two affected differently by the new tax laws. For major changes in federal income tax policy example, the 1982 Subchapter S Revision Act which have directly affected farm operators.
had a significant impact on formation and opFirst, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 eration of Subchapter S (family) corporations. (ERTA), the largest overall tax reduction bill in However, the analysis of the tax laws in this history, had widespread effects on the agriculstudy deals strictly with sole proprietorships. tural production sector as well as the whole There are numerous provisions in the tax law economy (Government Printing Office, 1981) .
which have an effect on farm operators. Yet, Secondly, only a year after ERTA, Congress passed the focus of this article is on changes which the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of occurred in the tax law during 1980-1982. 1982 (TEFRA) (Government Printing Office, Those changes which will likely have a signif-1982). This second Act was the largest tax revicant impact on farm operator income tax liaenue generating bill in history. While the overbilities follow. One area of important change all impact of these new tax laws has been to under TEFRA deals with the regular and alterlower the iicome tax liabilities of farm opernative minimum taxes. Table 1 describes how ators, the question remains as to whether farm these taxes were computed prior to TEFRA. operators have benefited.
Beginning January 1, 1983, however, the regAlthough much has been written on the imular minimum tax was eliminated and farm oppact of individual tax law changes on farm erators were required to pay the greater of the operators, the issue of the cumulative effect of regular income tax liability after credits and these changes on farm operators has largely not the alternative minimum tax. The new alterbeen addressed (Davenport, Boehlje, and Mar- native minimum tax structure involves a comtin; Richardson, Nixon, and Smith) . The purpose plicated interplay among capital gains income, of this paper is to assess the cumulative ecoaccelerated depreciation in excess of straightnomic impacts of the changing tax laws on farm line on real estate and leased equipment, exoperators. The tax law provisions under prepensed intangible drilling costs, percentage de-ERTA, ERTA, and TEFRA are compared by simpletion in excess of basis, certain interest and ulating their effects on a typical rice farmer on other deductions, and the farm operator's marthe Texas Gulf Coast.
ginal tax rate in the regular tax calculation. For erty: 3 year class-6 perreducing basis for depreciacent, 5-7 years-6.6 percent cent, 5-, 10-and 15-year tion by 1/2 of investment and 7 or more years--10 class-10 percent. Investtax credit claimed or taking percent. Investment tax ment tax credit has no effect 2 percent less investment credit claimed has no effect on basis for depreciation. tax credit than allowed with on basis for depreciation.
Used property limitation inno effect on depreciable baUsed property limitation creased to $125,000 for sis beginning January 1, $100,000.
1981-1984 and to $150,000 1983. for 1985 and thereafter. "At risk" limitations extended to investment tax credit.
Investment tax credit
Based on how long asset was Two percent of the credit is Same as ERTA except to corecapture kept in service by taxpayer; earned for each full year incide with investment tax 0-3 years-all recaptured, 3-that the asset is kept in sercredit rules, the adjusted ba-5 years-2/3 of maximum vice. sis for computing gain or credit recaptured, 5-7 loss is increased by one-half years-1/3 of maximum of the investment tax credit credit recaptured and 7 or recapture upon disposition. more years-no recapture.
When example, investment in tax credit generating tax liability. On the other hand, since investactivities will not provide the income tax benment tax credit is not affected by subsequent efits previously realized for farm operators who sales prices, if the asset is likely to increase in have substantial capital gains income.
value (or decrease in value slower than cost The alternative minimum tax under TEFRA recovery deductions); the farm operator should (Section 55 of the Internal Revenue Code) is utilize the full investment tax credit. This is basically a combination of the regular and albecause the depreciation recapture provisions ternative minimum tax under ERTA. Furtherunder Section 1245 of the Internal Revenue more, the new tax preference items added by Code require that when the sales price of the TEFRA increased the probability that moderate asset exceeds the asset's adjusted tax basis, the to high income farm operators will be affected difference is treated as ordinary income in the by the alternative minimum tax. Farm operators year of the sale. The recapture of investment especially vulnerable to the new alternative tax credit, under Section 47 of the Internal minimum tax are those who have large capital
Revenue Code, however, is based solely on how gains income and/or income tax credits.
long the asset is kept in service and not on Careful tax planning is needed to maximize value. taxpayer benefit under the new alternative minimum tax rules. For example, if a farm operator expects to pay the alternative minimum tax, it SIMULATION MODEL AND TYPICAL will be beneficial to shift additional taxable FARM income into the current year. The reason being that this income will not be taxed as long as the alternative minimum tax liability exceeds To compare the cumulative economic imthe regular income tax liability less tax credits.
pacts of these three income tax programs on a For farm operators using the cash method of typical farm, a Monte Carlo, firm-level simulatax accounting, such a procedure could easily tion approach was selected. The Firm Level be accomplished by year-end sales of crops and Income Tax and Farm Policy Simulator (FLIPSIM livestock. In addition, year-end equipment pur-V) was selected for the analysis because it is chases designed to reduce income taxes should capable of simulating a typical farm for alterbe carefully analyzed to ensure that the intended native income tax provisions. FLIPSIM V is a tax benefits will be realized in light of the new firm level, Monte Carlo simulation model which alternative minimum tax. This will be especially simulates the annual production, farm policy, critical where large investment tax credits were marketing, financial management, and income previously used to reduce the farm operator's tax aspects of a typical farm. The three income income tax liability generated by large capital tax provisions (pre-ERTA, ERTA, and TEFRA) gains income.
were analyzed under conditions of uncertainty The expensing provision under ERTA and (random prices and yields) to quantify the prob-TEFRA are similar to additional first year deable impacts of these policies on the typical preciation under pre-ERTA, except that expenfarm's viability. 1 sing reduces the basis for the investment tax FLIPSIM V has been described elsewhere credit. The tradeoff between electing expensing (Richardson, Lemieux, and Nixon) so a detailed versus the full investment tax credit will gendescription of the model is not included here. erally be determined by the taxpayer's marginal A special version of the original model (FLIPtax bracket. The higher the marginal income SIM-TAX) was used for this analysis. This new tax bracket, the more benefit the farm operator model did not include the machinery leasing receives through expensing because expensing sections of the computer program described by is a reduction in taxable income whereas inRichardson, Lemieux, and Nixon. Additionally, vestment tax credit is a reduction in the income FLIPSIM-TAX was expanded to include the income tax provisions of pre-ERTA, ERTA, and in the first year of the planning horizon. Annual The operator was a part owner and had 60 loan rates and target prices for 1984-1992 were percent equity in 412 acres of cropland while obtained by inflating the 1983 values for these leasing the remainder on a share lease. Cropvariables 5 percent per year. The replacement share leases in the area involved the landlord cost of machinery was assumed to increase 5 receiving 10 percent of the crop and paying percent per year while the nominal market value his share of grain drying costs (Gerlow) . Enof used equipment was assumed to remain conterprise budgets for the typical farm were destant. 4 Annual interest rates were assumed to be veloped using the Oklahoma State Budget 8 percent over the entire planning horizon for Generator (Richardson and Bailey) .
both long-and intermediate-term debts. 5 Land The farm was simulated assuming all provalues were assumed to increase 5 percent per duction costs increase 5 percent per year year over the planning horizon. throughout the planning horizon. The average It was assumed the farm operator did not rice prices for 1976-1981, Table 2 , were used elect to utilize the expensing provision under as the mean prices for the first year in the ERTA. This assumption was used because the 2 The pre-ERTA tax section of the model for calculating farm operator tax liabilities over the planning horizon included: (a) the 1980 income tax schedules held constant for all years of the simulation, (b) additional first-year depreciation, (c) double-declining balance depreciation, (d) full investment tax credit with no basis reduction, and (e) the pre-1982 alternative minimum tax, regular minimum tax, and income averaging. The ERTA tax section of the model included: (a) the tax rate schedules for 1981-1984 with indexing for 1985 and beyond, (b) accelerated cost recovery deductions (ACRS), (c) first year expensing, (d) full investment fax credit with no basis adjustment, and (e) the pre-1982 alternative minimum tax, regular minimum tax, and income averaging. Finally, the TEFRA tax section of the model included: (a) the tax rate schedules for 1981-1984 with indexing for 1985 and beyond, (b) ACRS, (c) first year expensing, (d) full investment tax credit with reduction in basis for depreciation, and (e) a revised alternative minimum tax and income averaging. The regular minimum tax was eliminated in TEFRA.
3 In all three scenarios, the operator had an initial debt of 40 percent on $409,200 of cropland and $247,700 of machinery. The initial net worth for the farm operator was $395,900, off-farm income was zero, family living expense was constant at $25,000 per year, and it was assumed the farm could not grow by increasing acres of cropland owned or leased.
4 Market value of used machinery was held constant rather than assuming it increases or decreases slightly over time. While the price of new machinery was rising 8 to 10 percent per year during the 1970's, the nominal value of used farm equipment in Texas increased about 1 percent per year (Richardson, Nixon, and Smith, p. 73) . Since new equipment prices were assumed to increase only 5 percent per year in this analysis, the rate of change in used equipment values was assumed to be zero. expensing provision did not change from ERTA RESULTS to TEFRA but the basis adjustment procedure when electing investment tax credit did. ThereResults of the simulation analyses under the fore, to assess the full impact of the basis adthree tax las are summarized in tables 3 and justment procedure under TEFRA (when electing 4 Wile t probability of survival for the investment tax credit), the full purchase price typical farm was the same under all three tax of the asset rather than the original purchase financial implications to the farm opprice less the amount expensed was used. The erator were not. The 1981 tax law (ERTA) clearly maximum investment tax credit was elected provided the farm operator with the best ending under all three tax law provisions.
financial position in terms of average ending The Consumer Price Index (CPI) used in the cash reserve, average present value of ending inc e x indexi for tax years net worth, and the lowest average overall tax 198-1992i e tax ingcre edu 5 percent anually liabilities, Table 3 . The operator's average after-1985-1992 was increased 5 percent annually tax net present value 9 experienced under TEFRA to coincide with the assumed rate of inflation. tax e peent u experienced under TEFRA All equipment acquired after 1980 was assumed was 5.2 percent greater than under the preto qualify for ACRS. Also, the farm operator was ERTA provisions and 1. percent less than under assumed to use the most rapid rate of deprethe ERTA provisions. Similarly, the average presciation permitted under the alternative tax laws ent value of ending net worth for the operator when purchasing new equipment. 6 under the provisions of TEFRA were 3.9 percent A bivariate probability distribution for rice greater than under the pre-ERTA provisions and yield (first crop and second crop) was develabout 1.3 percent lessthan under the ERTA oped from producer's yield records in the Gulf provisions. Coast. Actual farm yields for 5 years (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) were used to develop empirical proba- aAfter-tax net present value is the present value of the licated 50 times (drawing a different set of net annual family withdrawals plus the present value of the change in net worth over the planning horizon. An afterrandom yields and prices for each iteration) to tax discount rate of 4 percent was used for the present generate a sample for various output variables value calculation. used to evaluate the cumulative impacts of the Probability of survival is the probability the typical farm used to evaluate the cumulative impacts of the will remain solvent, i.e., maintain at least a 30 percent three income tax policies. equity to assets ratio, for 10 years.
The operator's average annual taxable income large investment tax credits will likely be reis greater under the provisions of TEFRA than quired to pay some alternative minimum tax. under ERTA in each year of the planning hoChanging the tax policy from ERTA to TEFRA rizon, Table 4 . Average annual net taxable inincreases the operator's average total personal come for the typical rice farmer was generally income tax liability from $65,500 to $69,300 greater under the pre-ERTA income tax provior about 5 percent over the 10-year period, sions and lower under the provisions of ERTA. Table 4 .,Changing the income tax provisions Of interest is the average income tax liability from per-ERTA to ERTA reduces the average incurred by the farm operator in 1986. In this annual income tax liabilities for the farm opcase, the average income tax liability under erator over the 10-year planning horizon from TEFRA is $800 less than under ERTA, Table 4. $113,300 to $65,000 or about 42 percent. DeThe difference is due to the alternative minispite the increased income tax liabilities brought mum tax computation. Under ERTA, earned inabout by TEFRA, farm operators in the Texas vestment tax credits reduced the operator's Gulf Coast will have 38 percent lower income income tax liability below the alternative mintax liabilities than they would have experienced imum tax amount. Hence, the alternative minunder the provisions of the pre-ERTA tax policy. imum tax became the income tax liability. Yet, While the tax laws strongly influence the cash under TEFRA, the $40,000 exclusion reduced flow of most business operations, the cumulathe farm operator's alternative minimum tax tive impact of the changing tax laws on farm below the regular tax liability after accounting operators' after-tax wealth position was not for the investment tax credit. Nevertheless, the greatly different between the three tax laws. structure of the alternative minimum tax under
The average present value of ending net worth TEFRA is such that middle to high income farm for the farm operator ranged from $680,300 operators with higher capital gain income or under pre-ERTA to $716,400 under ERTA, with the value for TEFRA falling in between at 5 percent and the change from ERTA to TEFRA $707,400, Table 3 . The standard deviation for reduced it about 1 percent. The reduced income ending net worth increased as the mean intax liabilities over a 10-year period for a farm creased and the operator experienced about the operator from pre-ERTA to TEFRA (about 38 same relative variation in present value of endpercent) will likely improve the cash flow poing net worth across all three income tax prosition of rice farmers in the Texas Gulf Coast. One change in the tax law which has imthe cumulative impacts of TEFRA on farm opportant implications for farmers in a planning erators. The main question to be addressed in mode under TEFRA is the effect of capital gain this paper related to the cumulative effects of income on income tax liabilities. With the ERTA and TEFRA on a farm operators' net farm changes which have occurred in the alternative income, personal income tax liabilities, and minimum tax since its initiation in 1978, this wealth.
"add-on" tax is reducing for many taxpayers, The cumulative effects of the income tax prothe benefits previously realized on capital gain visions of pre-ERTA, ERTA, and TEFRA on a farm income. While 40 percent of the net long-term operator were quantified by simulating a typical capital gain is added to taxable income, the Texas Gulf Coast rice farm under all three tax remaining 60 percent deduction becomes part policies for 10 years. The Firm Level Income of the alternative minimum tax computation. Tax and Farm Policy Simulator (FLIPSIM V) was Farm operators would be advised to time their used to simulate the typical farm. For each capital gain income in years of either high farm income tax policy, the farm was simulated over income or other income as well as high quala 10-year planning horizon which in turn was ifying deductions. replicated 50 times using a different set of ranResults of this study also suggest that the tax dom crop prices and yields for each year. Results policy changes in 1981 provided farmers an of the analysis indicate that the typical Texas incentive to invest in farm machinery and thus Gulf Coast rice farm will not be greatly affected expand supply. Even though the change from by the change in the income tax provisions ERTA to TEFRA gave farm operators a negative from pre-ERTA to ERTA to TEFRA. The probasupply incentive regarding investment in mability that the typical part-owner rice farmer in chinery, many farmers may still perceive a the region will remain solvent for 10 years was positive investment incentive due to comparing the same (98 percent) across all three income TEFRA provisions to the pre-ERTA provisions. tax policies. Only minor changes in the operImpacts of federal income tax policy on farm ator's expected income earning potential and machinery investments and thus the capacity of ending wealth position were observed for the agriculture to supply food and fiber have largely three income tax policies.
been ignored by policymakers in developing Changes in the income tax provisions from farm programs. As a result, the supply incentive pre-ERTA to ERTA increased the operator's excomponents of ERTA and TEFRA reduced the pected after-tax net present value (for a 1 -year efficiency of the 1982-84 acreage set asides for period) only 6.9 percent and the change from cotton and grains. In the future more attention ERTA to TEFRA decreased it 1.6 percent. Simshould be paid to the impacts of federal income ilarly, the change from pre-ERTA to ERTA intax policy on the effectiveness of farm programs, creased the operator's expected present value particularly the impacts on the effectiveness of of ending net worth (for a 1 0-year period) about supply control programs.
